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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BARBARA SCHWARZ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

APPELLEES' BRIEF

STATE OF UTAH, STATE RECORDS
COMMITTEE, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ERIC A. STENE;
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS; AND
VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAVID E.
DANGERFIELD,

Case No. 20030875

Defendants/Appellees.

APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO

COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The parties are accurately and completely identified in the caption.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2002). By order dated December 4, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court
transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4) (2002).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
L

Should this Court consider issues that Schwarz failed to preserve in the

court below or properly brief on appeal?
Standard of Review: Arguments not raised in the court below are waived. State v.
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,1J13, 54 P.3d 645. If an appellant fails to adequately
brief the issues, the appellate court may decline to consider the argument.
Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634, at
*2 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2003) (unpublished opinion, attached hereto as
Addendum A).
2.

Did the trial court correctly determine that Schwarz failed to state a claim

against the State of Utah, its agencies and its staff? (R. 80-81, 127-130).
Schwarz incorrectly states that this is an appeal from a order granting summary
judgment. This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss.
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion to dismiss is a question of law that the
appellate court reviews for correctness, "considering] only the legal sufficiency of
the complaint" and giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Utah Safe
to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ^11; State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,1(17, 70 P.3d 111; Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17,f8, 71 P.3d
589.
3.

Did the trial court correctly determine that Schwarz's claim against the State
2

and its agencies is barred by collateral estoppel? (R. 80-81, 127-130).
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion to dismiss is a question of law that the
appellate court reviews for correctness, "considering] only the legal sufficiency of
the complaint" and giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Utah Safe
to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ^fl 1; State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,1J17, 70 P.3d 111; Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, ^[8, 71 P.3d
589.
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The full text of the following determinative statutes pertinent to the issues before
the Court is attached as Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-403 (Supp. 2003)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 (1997)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute over access to government records. (R.90). Plaintiff,
Barbara Schwarz ("Schwarz"), filed this lawsuit after the Department of Human Services
("the Department") denied her access to records and the State Records Committee ("the
Committee") initially denied her an administrative appeal. Id. The Committee
subsequently gave her a hearing, which resulted in a separate appeal to the Third District
Court concerning the same subject matter. Id; see Third District Court Case
#010907201. Judge Frederick granted a dispositive motion in that case. (R. 90).
Schwarz 5 s subsequent appeal resulted in a Memorandum Decision from this Court. See
3

Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634 (Utah Ct.
App. Nov. 28, 2003). The facts leading to both lawsuits are detailed below.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On March 9, 2001, Schwarz sent a letter to the State of Utah, Division of Mental
Health ("the Division"), requesting that they provide her "with a copy of your
correspondence, the letters, cards, e-mail, memoranda, notes, etc. that you received and
generated in regards of me." (R. 90). Schwarz then sent a second letter to the Division
requesting that they provide her with "all your records on me." Id.
The Division's attorney, Dawn M. Hibl, responded to Schwarz's letters and denied
her requests, asserting that she was not entitled to the name of the referent which the
Division regarded as confidential. The Division provided Schwarz with the email that
had been received from the referent with the name of the author redacted. The title,
employer and phone number of the author were not redacted. (R. 90-91).
Schwarz appealed the Division's decision to the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. The Executive Director of the Department affirmed the denial.
Schwarz appealed the Executive Director's decision to the State Records Committee
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-402 (1997) and § 63-2-403 (Supp. 2003). (R. 91).
Division of State Archives employee Richard Francom, acting on behalf of the
Executive Secretary for the Committee, initially denied Schwarz's request for a hearing.
Francom wrote: "From the information you have given it appears that the Department of
Human Services has fulfilled your request and provided you with a copy of all the records
4

they have relating to you," adding that "[t]he State Records Committee has no jurisdiction
over the Legal Services Corporation . . . ." Id
Acting on the advice of counsel, the Committee reversed Mr. Francom's
administrative decision to deny Schwarz an appeal hearing but, before the hearing could
be held, Schwarz sued the Committee and the other defendants named in this lawsuit.
Among other things, Schwarz claimed she was entitled to know the name of the referent.
The Committee subsequently held a hearing July 11, 2001 pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-2-403, which resulted in a written Decision and Order. The Committee found that
the Division had properly classified the identity of the referent as a private or controlled
record. (R. 91-92).
Relying on Utah Code § 63-2-403(1 l)(b), the Committee ordered disclosure
notwithstanding the classification. This statute provides that "the records committee may,
upon consideration and weighting of the various interests and public policies pertinent to
the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information
properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the public interest favoring access
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-403(1 l)(b)
(Supp.2003). (R.92).
The July 16, 2001, Decision and Order specifically ordered the Division to allow
Schwarz access to the referent's name on the basis that the "public interest is served by
allowing Ms. Schwarz to identify the person who has provided information about her to
the government" Among other things, the Committee felt this would be necessary for
5

Schwarz to correct any misinformation given to the government by the referent. Id
The Division appealed the decision to the District Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-404. The Committee and the Division filed cross motions for a judgment on
the pleadings. Judge Frederick granted the Division's Motion and denied the
Committee's motion. (R. 92-93).
On March 30, 2003, Schwarz filed a Notice of Appeal. On November 28, 2003,
this Court issued a Memorandum Decision affirming the district court's judgment.
Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634 (Utah Ct.
App. Nov. 28, 2003). The present case was essentially inactive while the parties litigated
the related matter.1 This appeal arises from the District Court's decision to grant
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, which were based on mootness, collateral estoppel and
the issue preclusion doctrine. (R. 127-130).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should not consider the issues raised in Schwarz's brief. Not only does
her brief fail to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, she fails
to properly brief and analyze the issues.
The trial court correctly determined that Schwarz failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Her claims against the State Records Committee and its staff

1

As previously indicated, this lawsuit arose from the initial decision to deny
Schwarz an administrative appeal. The Committee reversed that determination and gave
Schwarz the administrative appeal she requested.
6

are moot because Schwarz received a hearing before the Committee.
Schwarz's claims are also barred by collateral estoppel. The central issue in this
case - whether Schwarz is entitled to the name of the author of an e-mail received by the
Division of Mental Health - is identical to the substantive issue recently litigated in
Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634 (Utah Ct.
App. Nov. 28, 2003). Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss, which argued that principles of mootness and collateral estoppel bar
the present action.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS THE ARGUMENTS MADE
IN SCHWARZ'S INADEQUATE BRIEF

The Utah Supreme Court has held that appealing parties must "clearly define[ ] the
issues presented on appeal with pertinent authority cited." Water & Energy Systems
Technology, Inc. v. KeiL 2002 UT 32, n.2, 48 P.3d 888 (internal quotations omitted). "A
reviewing court should not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." Id.
Generally, "[a]n issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Smith v.
Smith, 1999 UT App 370,1}8, 995 P.2d 14.
As this court recently recognized in Schwarz's related case, "briefs must include
citations to the relevant portions of the record, demonstrate that the issues on appeal were
preserved, marshal the evidence supporting any disputed factual finding, and cite and

7

analyze relevant law." Department of Hum. Servs. v. Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003
WL 22827634 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2003). Schwarz not only inadequately briefs the
issues she raises, she fails to analyze the only issue properly before the Court - are the
claims alleged in her complaint barred by the doctrines of mootness and collateral
estoppel?
In brief response to the issues Schwarz does raise, Appellees assert that the Order
granting Appellees/Defendants' Motions to Dismiss conforms with applicable court rules
concerning orders. More precisely, the Order in this case states that it was entered upon
Defendants' motions to dismiss. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The Order was entered after
Judge Fratto redacted Defendants' proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
because the Order was based on insufficiency of Schwarz's Complaint for Injunctive
Relief and Supplemental Complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5; R. 1-8, 41-45, 119, 127-131;
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52 ("The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions . . . . The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b)
. . . . when the motion is based on more than one ground."). In the present case, the court
found no cause of action. (R. 119 (Hearing Minutes at 10:56 - "The court states findings
and grants the motion to dismiss finding no cause of action.")).
Schwarz vaguely complains about the fact that three judges allegedly "recused"
themselves from participating in this case. Although the record is somewhat unclear on
this issue, it appears the case was initially assigned to Judge Young in May 2001. Judge
8

Lubeck was assigned the case in June 2001. It was then reassigned to Judge Burton in
August 2001. No dispositive motions were filed by the parties until Judge Fratto took
over the case in September 2002.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the Rules of Judicial Administration
grant discretion to the presiding judge to assign cases. Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule
3-104(3)(E); High Country Estates Homeowners Assn. v. Baglev & Co., 2000 UT 27, ^
11; 996 P.2d 534; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-29(5)(b) (2002). In High Country
Estates, the court held that "rule 3-104 grants authority to the presiding judge to make
initial case assignments and to reassign cases when necessary. Rule 3-108, for instance,
enumerates several justifications for reassignment within the particular context of judicial
assistance." High Country Estates Homeowners Assn., 2000 UT 27, % 14; 996 P.2d 534.
In short, "presiding judges have broad discretion in reassigning cases." Id; see also Utah
R. Civ. P. 63(a).
Appellees recognize that unless a justification for reassignment exists, a judge has
a duty to retain a case until it is completed. The justification for reassignment in this case
is not clear from the record. It is worth noting, however, that besides the filing of the
Answer to the Complaint, no significant proceedings had taken place prior to Judge
Fratto's assignment. Furthermore, no dispositive motions were pending. 2 In light of

2

Schwarz did file several documents, titled as motions, notices and/or affidavits, to
inform the court of the status of the related case before the State Records Committee and
to protest various matters regarding the logging of her filings in the court docket. The
first substantive motions filed by either party were Defendants' Motions to Dismiss,
9

these facts, it cannot seriously be argued that the reassignment of the case to Judge Fratto
had any impact on Schwarz's procedural or substantive rights.3
Granted, a "lay person acting as . .. her own attorney 'should be accorded every
consideration that may be reasonably indulged/" Wurst v. Department of Employment
Sea, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (Utah App. 1991). Courts, however, have generally
allowed improper filings only when necessary "in the interests of justice to protect a
valuable constitutional right" State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986).
Schwarz's constitutional rights are not at issue in this case. She sought access to
government records classified as private, exercised her appeal rights when she was denied
access to a portion of one record and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claim.
As in the other appeal, Schwarz's brief in the present case fails to address the only issue
before the Court. Given that Schwarz's brief is so lacking in its analysis and
identification of the proper issues as to shift the burden of research and argument to the
Court, it should refrain from addressing the arguments in her brief Department of Hum.
Servs. v. Schwarz. 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634, at *2 (Utah Ct App. Nov. 28,

which the State defendants filed with Judge Fratto on June 17, 2003.
3

Schwarz also claims she was denied her right to a jury trial. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-2-404(7)(b) states that the court shall review orders of the State Records Committee
de novo, without a jury. Finally, Schwarz alleges that Judge Fratto had ex parte
communication with the defendants. No such communication took place. Schwarz's
false allegation appears to be based on the court clerk's notes regarding the availability of
the parties to appear at a hearing on one of several alternative dates. A copy of those
notes is attached hereto as Addendum C. There is no evidence that any of the defendants
had ex parte communication with Judge Fratto concerning this case.
10

2003) ("If an appellant fails to adequately brief the issues, the appellate court may decline
to consider the argument."); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(j) ("[a]ll briefs under this rule
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings, and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters."). Schwarz's brief
does not comply with this rule and should accordingly be disregarded. See Utah R. App.
P. 240).
IL

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
SCHWARZ HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE
STATE OF UTAH, THE RECORDS COMMITTEE OR ITS STAFF

The trial court correctly determined that the Complaint fails to set forth a factual
basis for claims alleged against the State, the Committee, or its staff. Paragraphs 43 and
44 of the Complaint allege that the Committee "did not grant [Schwarz] any hearing" or
"advise [her] on any further appeal rights." (R. 7). While it is true that Schwarz initially
did not get an appeal hearing before the Committee, that determination was subsequently
reversed on an administrative level. Schwarz received a hearing before the Committee.
There is no dispute that the hearing resulted in a written Decision and Order. Schwarz
participated in the subsequent district court appeal of that Decision and Order, which the
Division filed against the Committee. Consequently, any claims Schwarz may have had
against the Committee and its staff for not granting her a hearing were rendered moot and
should not be addressed by this court. See Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. 2003 UT 51, ^} 132,
82 P.3d 1076 (appellate court will not adjudicate issues when the requested judicial relief
cannot affect the rights of the litigants).
11

III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
SCHWARZ'S CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE AND ITS AGENCIES
IS BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

It is well settled that the doctrine of "issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of
issues in a subsequent action." Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108,
f 25, 44 P.3d 642.4 Schwarz's claims against the State of Utah and its agencies arise out
of the same government records request that was the subject of the recent lawsuit before
Judge Frederick. That case was resolved on dispositive cross-motions. The prior action
was dismissed because the court found that the Division's classification of the requested
records was proper. Schwarz appealed. That appeal was dismissed due to Schwarz's
failure to adequately brief the issue before the court. See Department of Hum. Servs. v.
Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, 2003 WL 22827634, at *2 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2003).
While the basis for Judge Fratto's decision in the present case does not detail the
specific grounds for granting defendants' Motions to Dismiss, it granted the Motions in
their entirety. (R. 130). That motion argued that all of the claims addressed in the prior
action are barred by issue preclusion.
The four elements of issue preclusion are: (i) the party against whom issue
preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one

4

Issue preclusion, often termed collateral estoppel, is one of two distinct branches
of the doctrine of res judicata. The other branch is claim preclusion. See Culbertson v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, fl2 n.6, 44 P.3d 642; see also Snyder v.
Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, f33, 73 P.2d 325.
12

presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ftJ5, 73 P.2d 325; In Re
General Determination of Rights to the Use of All Water, Murdock v. Springville
Municipal Corp., 1999 UT 39, ^18, 982 P.2d 65.
The first element is satisfied in this case. The same Barbara Schwarz who is the
plaintiff in this matter was allowed to intervene as a defendant before Judge Frederick in
Third District Court Case No. 010907201. Schwarz filed pleadings and objections with
the Court after it granted a stipulation of the parties allowing her to intervene in the
lawsuit (R. 94-95).
The second element, that the issues be identical, is also met. It is not necessary
that the legal question be the same in both actions, only that the factual issues be the
same. Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983); see also Berry v. Berry,
738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah App. 1987); Cooper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d
387, 390 (Utah App. 1987). The government records request to the State of Utah, about
which Schwarz complained in this action, is the same request that was at issue in the
related action. (R. 95).
The third element, full and fair litigation, requires only that "the parties must
receive notice, reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appraise them of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Career
Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 939 (Utah 1997). The
13

prior litigation met this requirement. Schwarz participated in that lawsuit and responded
to the parties' motions for judgment on the pleadings. Schwarz clearly had notice of the
action and had an opportunity to present her arguments and objections to the dispositive
motions filed by the Committee (as her co-defendant in that case) and the Division (which
appealed the Committee's decision ordering the disclosure of the requested record to
Schwarz).
Finally, the prior action ended with a final judgment entered against Schwarz and
the Committee, from which she appealed and lost. Judge Frederick expressly held that
"the interests favoring access are outweighed by the interests favoring restriction of
access to the referent's name. See Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(8)." Judge Frederick also
held that "interests such as guarding against the invasion of personal privacy, protecting
the safety of private individuals, and promoting candid referrals for public assistance
favor restriction of access to the referent's name."
All four elements of issue preclusion have been met; therefore, Judge Fratto in this
case was correct in concluding that Schwarz's present action should be dismissed. The
prior decision of Judge Frederick is binding upon Schwarz as to the classification of the
requested record. There is no dispute that Schwarz appealed Judge Frederick's decision
denying her access to the remainder of the subject e-mail Having fully and fairly
litigated the substantive issue in this case in the prior matter, the plaintiff is bound by
collateral estoppel.

14

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's order granting
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.
DATED this Z&

day of April, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

HU£.&
MARK E. BURNS
Assistant Attorney General

JOEL FERRE
assistant Attorney General

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellees' Brief
was mailed, postage prepaid, this £Lr

day of April, 2004, to:

Barbara Schwarz
335 East Broadway, Apt 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Appellant Pro Se
John Wunderli
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Valley Mental Health
5961 South 900 East, Suite 420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

C^\J^^Ju^r<JL^
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ADDENDUM A

Page 1

Wfetlaw
Not Reported in P 2d
2003 UT App 406
(Cite as: 2003 WL 22827634 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING

Court of Appeals of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH, Plaintiff and
Appellee,
v
Barbara SCHWARZ and Utah State Records
Committee, Defendants and Appellant
No. 20030324-CA.
Nov 28, 2003

Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable
J Dennis Frederick
Barbara Schwarz, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se
MarkL Shurtleffand Joel A Ferre, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges
THORNE

DAVIS, GREENWOOD,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM
*1 Barbara Schwarz appeals the district court's ruling
that the Department of Human Services, Division of
Mental Health (Division) was not required to disclose
the name of a person providing a referral to the
Division pertaining to Schwarz
Schwarz made a request under the Utah Government
Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), Utah
Code Ann ^ 63 2 101 to -909 (1997 & Supp 2003),
for all records pertaining to her that were in the
possession of the Division The Division provided an
electronic mail message that referred Schwarz's name

to the Division for mental health services, but it
redacted the author's name pursuant to a policy to
ensure the anonymity of persons making referrals The
Executive Director of the Department of Human
Services affirmed the decision On appeal, the Utah
State Records Committee (Records Committee) agreed
that the Division properly classified the name of a
referent as a "private" or "controlled" record, however,
it ordered disclosure of the name because "the public
interest favonng access outweighs the interest favonng
restriction of access" See Utah Code Ann §
63 2 40^(11Kb) (Supp 2003) (allowing disclosure of
records classified as pnvate, protected, or controlled if
Records Committee determines "public interests
favonng access outweighs the interest favonng
restriction of access") The Division petitioned for
judicial review in district court See LtahCode Ann §
63-46b-15 (1997) (allowing distnct court de novo
review of final agency actions resulting from informal
adjudicative proceedings)
Utah Code Ann § 63-2 404(8)(a) (1997) states that
"[t]he court may, upon consideration and weighing of
the vanous interests and public policies pertinent to the
classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the
disclosure of information properly classified as pnvate,
controlled, or protected if the interest favonng access
outweighs the interest favoring restnction of access "
The district court vacated the Record Committee's order
requinng the Division to disclose the referent's name,
after finding that "the interests favoring access are
outweighed by the mterests favonng restnction of
access to the referent's name " The court specifically
found "that interests such as guarding against the
invasion of personal privacy, protecting the safety of
pnvate individuals, and promoting candid referrals for
public assistance favor restnction of access to the
referent's name "
The issue before this court is whether the district court
conectly ruled that the mterests favormg access to the
referent's name are outweighed by the mterests favonng
restnction of access The Division contends that
because Schwarz has failed to analyze or adequately
bnef the issue, we should not address her arguments
See Watei & Eneixv S\<> Tech Inc v hell 2002 LT
32,<[H n 2, 48 P 3d 888 We agree Schwarz's bnefs
fail to properly address or analyze the issue before this
court The briefs contain no citations to the record m
this case, and no analysis of relevant statutory or case
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law.
*2 Although the Division also briefed the merits of the
appeal, neither an opposing party, nor the appellate
courts, are obligated to address deficiencies in an
appellant's briefing. See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App
370,118, 995 P.2d 14 ("An issue is inadequately briefed
when the overall analysis is so lacking as to shift the
burden of research and analysis to the reviewing
court."). Accordingly, briefs must include citations to
the relevant portions of the record, demonstrate that
issues raised on appeal were preserved, marshal the
evidence supporting any disputed factual finding, and
cite and analyze relevant law. See Utah R.App. P.
24(a)(9). If an appellant fails to adequately brief the
issues, the appellate court may decline to consider the
argument. See Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1110
(Utah Ct.App. 1995); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746
P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct.App.1987). In addition, rule
24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
that M[a]ll briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper
headings, and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial, or scandalous matters." Non-complying
briefs can be stricken or disregarded. See Utah R.App.
P. 24(j). Schwarz's briefs contain material that may be
stricken or disregarded by this court.
Schwarz requests this court to consider that she is a pro
se litigant without the resources available to the
Appellee in this case. However, Schwarz has frequently
appeared in the district and appellate courts in this state
and may be held to the standard appropriate to her
experience. Since 1990, Schwarz has filed no fewer
than fifteen pro se appeals in this court or the Utah
Supreme Court, as well as three petitions for writ of
certiorari. We also note that this appeal results from a
civil proceeding initiated by Schwarz. "When an
individual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a
matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro se
status is manifestly inappropriate." Lundahl v. Quinn,
2003 UT 1 UT 4, 67 P.3d 1000. Accordingly, Schwarz
may "be charged with full knowledge and
understanding of all relevant statutes, rules, and case
law." Id. at H 5.
Based upon the failure to adequately brief the issue
before the court, we decline to address Schwarz's
arguments on appeal and affirm the district court's
judgment.
2003 WL 22827634 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App 406
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM B

63-2-403. Appeals to the records committee.
(1) A petitioner, including an aggrieved person who did not participate in the appeal to the
governmental entity's chief administrative officer, may appeal to the records committee by filing a
notice of appeal with the executive secretary no later than:
(a) 30 days after the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity has granted or denied the
records request in whole or in part, including a denial under Subsection 63-2-204(7);
(b) 45 days after the original request for records if:
(i) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401(l)(b) occur; and
(ii) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401.
(2) The notice of appeal shall contain the following information:
(a) the petitioner's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number;
(b) a copy of any denial of the records request; and
(c) the relief sought.
(3) The petitioner may file a short statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the
appeal.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), no later than three business days after receiving a
notice of appeal, the executive secretary of the records committee shall:
(i) schedule a hearing for the records committee to discuss the appeal at the next regularly scheduled
committee meeting falling at least 14 days after the date the notice of appeal is filed but no longer than
45 days after the date the notice of appeal was filed provided, however, the records committee may
schedule an expedited hearing upon application of the petitioner and good cause shown;
(ii) send a copy of the notice of hearing to the petitioner; and
(iii) send a copy of the notice of appeal, supporting statement, and a notice of hearing to:
(A) each member of the records committee;
(B) the records officer and the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity from which the
appeal originated;
(C) any person who made a business confidentiality claim under Section 63-2-308 for a record that is
the subject of the appeal; and
(D) all persons who participated in the proceedings before the governmental entity's chief
administrative officer.
(b) (i) The executive secretary of the records committee may decline to schedule a hearing if the
record series that is the subject of the appeal has been found by the committee in a previous hearing
involving the same government entity to be appropriately classified as private, controlled, or protected.
(ii) (A) If the executive secretary of the records committee declines to schedule a hearing, the
executive secretary of the records committee shall send a notice to the petitioner indicating that the
request for hearing has been denied and the reason for the denial.
(B) The committee shall make rules to implement this section as provided by Title 63, Chapter 46a,
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(5) (a) A written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the governmental
entity's position must be submitted to the executive secretary of the records committee not later than five
business days before the hearing.
(b) The governmental entity shall send a copy of the written statement to the petitioner by
first class mail, postage prepaid. The executive secretary shall forward a copy of the written statement to
each member of the records committee.
(6) No later than ten business days after the notice of appeal is sent by the executive secretary, a
person whose legal interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding may file a request for
intervention before the records committee. Any written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in
support of the intervener's position shall be filed with the request for intervention. The person seeking
intervention shall provide copies of the statement to all parties to the proceedings before the records
committee.

(7) The records committee shall hold a hearing within the period of time described in Subsection (4).
(8) At the hearing, the records committee shall allow the parties to testify, present evidence, and
omment on the issues. The records committee may allow other interested persons to comment on the
ssues.
(9) (a) The records committee may review the disputed records. However, if the committee is
weighing the various interests under Subsection (11), the committee must review the disputed records.
The review shall be in camera.
(b) Members of the records committee may not disclose any information or record reviewed by the
committee in camera unless the disclosure is otherwise authorized by this chapter.
(10) (a) Discovery is prohibited, but the records committee may issue subpoenas or other orders to
compel production of necessary evidence.
(b) When the subject of a records committee subpoena disobeys or fails to comply with the subpoena,
he records committee may file a motion for an order to compel obedience to the subpoena with the
listrict court.
(c) The records committers review shall be de novo.
(11) (a) No later than three business days after the hearing, the records committee shall issue a signed
3rder either granting the petition in whole or in part or upholding the determination of the governmental
sntity in whole or in part.
(b) The records committee may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public
policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of
information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the public interest favoring access
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access.
(c) In making a determination under Subsection (1 l)(b), the records committee shall consider and,
where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of the record in order to protect
privacy interests in the case of private or controlled records, business confidentiality interests in the case
of records protected under Subsections 63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public interest
in the case of other protected records.
(12) The order of the records committee shall include:
(a) a statement of reasons for the decision, including citations to this chapter, court rule or order,
another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation that governs disclosure of the record, provided
that the citations do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information;
(b) a description of the record or portions of the record to which access was ordered or denied,
provided that the description does not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or
information exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b);
(c) a statement that any party to the proceeding before the records committee may appeal
the records committee's decision to district court; and
(d) a brief summary of the appeals process, the time limits for filing an appeal, and a notice that in
order to protect its rights on appeal, the party may wish to seek advice from an attorney.
(13) If the records committee fails to issue a decision within 35 days of the filing of the notice of
appeal, that failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order denying the appeal. The petitioner shall
notify the records committee in writing if he considers the appeal denied.
(14) (a) Each government entity shall comply with the order of the records committee and, if records
are ordered to be produced, file:
(i) a notice of compliance with the records committee upon production of the records; or
(ii) a notice of intent to appeal.
(b) (i) If the government entity fails to file a notice of compliance or a notice of intent to appeal, the
records committee may do either or both of the following:
(A) impose a civil penalty of up to $500 for each day of continuing noncompliance; or
(B) send written notice of the entity's noncompliance to the governor for executive branch entities, to
the Legislative Management Committee for legislative branch entities, and to the Judicial Council for

judicial branch agencies entities,
(ii) In imposing a civil penalty, the records committee shall consider the gravity and circumstances of
the violation, including whether the failure to comply was due to neglect or was willflil or intentional.
Amended by Chapter 245, 1999 General Session
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63-2-404, Judicial review.
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial review by
he district court of the records committee's order.
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the records committee's order.
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review.
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee shall be served with notice of the petition in
iccordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a governmental entity's
determination as specified in Subsection 63-2-402 (l)(b).
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than:
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request by either providing the
requested records or denying the request in whole or in part;
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to respond to the request; or
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if:
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401(1 )(b) occur; and
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401.
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and shall contain:
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address;
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a
prior appeal to the records committee;
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental entity that issued the initial determination with
a copy of that determination;
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief.
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a protected record, the court shall allow the
claimant of business confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the claim of business
confidentiality.
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be in camera.
(7) The court shall:
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of evidence presented to the records committee;
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a jury; and
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity.
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public policies
pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information
properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs the
interest favoring restriction of access.
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of
the record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of private or controlled
records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records protected under Subsections 63-2-304(1)
and (2), and privacy interests or the public interest in the case of other protected records.
Amended by Chapter 133, 1995 General Session
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